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Joe Pi lot ta
Contextualizing Democratization
and the Practice of Social Research
(Demokratijos kontekstualizacija ir socialinio tyrimo praktika)
Santrauka. Straipsnyje nagrinëjama demokratinës þinojimo visuomenës koncepcija, kuri remiasi metodologi-
nëmis fenomenologinës sociologijos pirmtako Alfredo Schützo prielaidomis, kad kiekvienas mûsø esti 1) kasdie-
nybës pasaulio praeivis, 2) ekspertas ir 3) gerai informuotas pilietis.
Socialinio veiksmo metodologijos poþiûriu, dialogas yra hermeneutinio interpretacinio supratimo raiðka,
apibrëþiama pagal dalies-visumos santyká. Hermeneutinis principas rodo, kad socialiniai mokslai remiasi ikiinter-
pretuotu, ikireflektyviu, ikiteoriniu gyvenamojo pasaulio pagrindu. Kitaip tariant, savaime suprantamos prasmës
atsargos, susidedanèios  ið kasdienio socialinio ir kultûros patyrimo, ir yra toji sàlyga, kuri leidþia kalbëti apie
teoriná þinojimà apie patyrimà. Dël ðios prieþasties socialinis mokslinis þinojimas yra reflektyvus. Jis priklauso nuo
ikisupratimo ar interpretacijos – nuo savo paties egzistavimo sàlygø supratimo.
Svarbus politinio autonomiðkumo principas – dialogas – esti nuoroda ne á kaþkà, bet su kaþkuo. Tai rodo
domëjimàsi kitu. Metodologinëje dialogo koncepcijoje, kuri remiasi bendruomenës supratimu, socialinis patyri-
mas nagrinëjamas kaip santykis tarp individualios savimonës, kito ir pasaulio. Dialogiðkas interpretacijos pobû-
dis nëra tik nuorodà á kità. Tai – þiûrëjimas su kitu. Tai – vieta, kur interpretacinis supratimas susiejamas su
bendruomenës „metodologija“. Paskiro þmogaus þinojimas yra kolektyvinio teisëtumo, bet ne privataus tyrimo
rezultatas. Ðá þinojimà ágyjame ðeimose, mokyklose, bendruomenëse; skaitydami knygas, laikraðèius, þiûrëdami
televizijà ir narðydami internete.
Siekdami iðsaugoti ir stiprinti gerai informuoto pilietiðkumo sàlygas, turime kurti tarpinius – vieðojo ðvietimo,
þurnalistinio etoso, sutartinës demokratijos – institutus, kuriø paskirtis yra bendrasis pilietinis gëris, kuriamas
bendromis pastangomis.  Ðiuo poþiûriu politinë þurnalistika ir komunikacija yra pirminës sàlygos, leidþianèios
iðsaugoti ir tæsti politinës (t.y. demokratinës) visuomenës principus.
Reikia skirti, viena vertus, politinæ komunikacijà ir, kita vertus, socialinæ bei individualiàjà veiklà. Pastaroji
susijusi su interesais. Kad ji taptø politine ir demokratine, jai stinga autonomijos. Politinë komunikacija – veikla,
kuri vadovaujasi autonomiðka vieðàja diskusija, - atsako uþ padarytus sprendimus. Ðiuo poþiûriu privatûs intere-
sai, kuriø motyvacija yra iracionali, slepia arba naikina racionalià ir laisvà vieðàjà diskusijà. O tokia diskusija
neturi bûti supaprastinta. Be to, ji neturi vengti prieðtaravimø. Tai, ko reikia vengti, yra pavirðutiniðkas poþiûris,
daþnai pateikiamas kaip „objektyvus“. Paprastai manoma: jeigu pateikiami du prieðingi poþiûriai, tai „proble-
ma“ jau yra suformuluota. Taèiau rimtas dialogas reikalauja kruopðèiai iðnagrinëti dalykà dar prieð pateikiant
vadinamuosius „skirtingus poþiûrius“. Paprastas poþiûriø pateikimas negali bûti esminë þinojimo sàlyga.
Grieþtai kalbant, politika turi vienà pagrindiná uþdaviná – atvirà sritá, kur kiekvienas bendruomenës narys
dalyvauja spræsdamas vieðuosius klausimus. Tokia laikysena rodo, kad visi bendruomenës nariai yra vienodai
ásipareigojæ dalyvauti vieðuose politiniuose svarstymuose. Tai – pastangos rûpintis politikos etosu, t.y. politiniu
bûdu, kuris iðsaugo ir stiprina vieðosios srities galimybæ. Kaip tik todël politinë-þurnalistinë komunikacija, kaip
demokratijos etoso dalis, turi suprasti perskyrà tarp vieðosios ir privaèiosios srièiø ir domëtis, ar politinio pobûdþio
teiginiai yra susijæ su vieðaisiais rûpesèiais. Demokratinës politinës þurnalistikos paskirtis – informuoti bendruo-
menæ apie maskuojanèià politinio teatro veiklà, jo nemokðiðkumà ir sprendimø stygiø. Tokia sritis nëra natûrali
arba socialinë. Tai – autonomiðka politinë sritis.
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Introduction
Political communication is strictly distinguis-
hed from social and individual activities that
are interest-laden and thus lack the autonomy
to be political.  The latter belongs solely to po-
litical societies that are democratic.  Indeed,
there must be a strict restriction of the use of
political” to a public domain in which every
member of society participates in public deba-
tes and decisions.  This participation is the con-
tinuous origination and maintenance of the po-
litical domain as a guarantee of human auto-
nomy and equality.
This equality suggests that the publicly ap-
pointed officials are bound by the democratic
ethos to maintain such a public domain and thus
are called on to communicate the public issues;
any communication that is designed for effect,
for rhetorical obfuscation, is interest-laden and
hence designed to advance the motives of an
individual or a group and not the concerns of
the public. In various ways, such a communica-
tion, and those who in their expertise help in
its design, adds to the legitimation crisis that
leads finally to public cynicism.
Political journalism, as part and parcel of
the originating and maintaining of the political
society, is designed to serve the public by provi-
ding information that is of public concern. This
is not to say that gossip columns of social inte-
rest are to be excluded from mass media.  Rat-
her, the primary task is information – despite the
tendency of the public officials and their experts
to obfuscate and mislead.  One could in fact ar-
gue that political journalism and communication
is, by now, the primary instrument of continuing
the origination and maintenance of political (i.e.,
democratic) society  (Mickunas, Pilotta 1999).
Democratic Principles
In the Western tradition, there are posited
two fundamental conceptions of the basis for
democracy. The first is the classical Greek
conception of human equality, based on a shared
human nature, and the second rests on the con-
ceptions stemming from various modern views.
The latter are subsumed under the title of politi-
cal enlightenment.  Although this title hides a
diverse set of conceptions, there are some basic
principles that are shared by them all.  First, there
is a rejection of human nature; second, there is a
postulation of human subject who is fundamen-
tally free both with respect to the natural envi-
ronment and all social and ethical norms.
Because the United States is founded on
modern conceptions, this essay focuses mainly
on modern understandings of freedom, auto-
nomy, and equality of the citizens of a democ-
ratic political community and its ethos.  The
ethos implies a primacy of communication over
power and domination. In turn, the primacy of
communication interconnects the various seg-
ments of the public, such as government, the
citizens, the mass media, and social research.
The principles of democracy, in which free
people are the final arbitrator, the free press
keeps the public informed, rest on the diffe-
rence between relationships that comprise a po-
litical community and other types of human re-
lationships. The answer demands a careful scru-
tiny of the founding of a political community,
which that it is the only one entitled to be cal-
led democratic. Only democracies deserve to be
called political.
Most types of human relationships rest on
numerous common interests.  Such interests may
become part of a democratic society. Yet there
is a difference between such interests and the
founding of a democratic community. The foun-
ding and the existence of such a community are
tied together inextricably.  Although there are
purposes that may comprise our common aims,
the democratic community is its own purpose
with an assumed duty by each citizen to main-
tain it. The reason for human relationships in a
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democratic community is this very relationship
that is identical to its own purpose.
Autonomy must be strictly distinguished
from freedom of choice. The choice is seen as a
power capable of selecting among options. Yet
in the final analysis, the choice is determined
by an underlying motive. In this sense, its base
is irrational. The freedom of autonomy is ana-
logous to logic wherein the structures are not
results of forces, but of rational and free postu-
lations; equality of all persons stems from au-
tonomy. If the rules, logics, rational discourses
are not derivable from natural states of affairs,
there is no criterion by which one cold render a
decision concerning the superiority or inferio-
rity of one postulate over another.  In this sen-
se, they are equal.  Autonomous freedom as ra-
tional in the above sense results in the equality
of persons who are in a position to posit the
rules by which they would govern their lives and
deal with the environment.
Each individual is an equal “law giver” to
oneself and the environment.  If there are com-
mon rules, they will not be discovered but posi-
ted and decided on in a public (i.e. political)
debate. Third, the modern concept of environ-
ment as material, coupled with the view that
the human is capable of remaking the environ-
ment in accordance with his or her designs, le-
ads to an increasing technologization of the so-
cial life and to an all pervasive technocratiza-
tion of politics, to political technocracy and bu-
reaucracy.
It is essential for the understanding of the
principles of democratic political society and
political activities that there can be no other
sources of rules apart from those originating
with the public covenant. One misunderstan-
ding must be avoided:  the autonomy of each
individual, as the unconditional source of law,
does not imply unrestricted activities.  It states
that the freely posited rules are not causes that
dominate human life but are rationally analy-
zable systems that can be modified and even re-
jected.  Autonomous freedom means a life un-
der freely posited, debated, and rationally achie-
ved rules (Habermas 1970).
Such an achievement is a matter of mutual
public debate and consensus.  Indeed, this is
the basic sense of the political:  a public do-
main where all members of a community parti-
cipate in the establishment and maintenance
both of this domain and the rules.  This is anot-
her way of saying that the political is identical
with a continuous activity of maintaining, of ori-
ginating the public domain as its own purpose.
This is another way of saying that the political
is identical with a continuous activity of main-
taining, of originating the public domain as its
own purpose.  This domain is the most basic po-
litical institution on which all other political ins-
titutions-including the establishment of speci-
fic constitutions- rest.  Without this institution,
without each member of society being able to
enter the public domain as an autonomous sour-
ce of rules, the basic meaning of the political
disappears.
One of the more important assertions is the
universality of law.  The universality is a gua-
rantee of rationality or the absence of contra-
dictions in a given law.  This is, every proposed
and approved law must be accepted by all, inc-
luding the one who proposed it. If one propo-
ses a law against stealing, then he or she too
must freely subject him or herself to the law.  If
a person decides to make an exception to him
or herself, then he or she contradicts him or
herself because in this case the law ceases to be
universal.
Any public claim to the universality of a
law must exclude such contractions.  But in this
sense, there is assumed freedom and equality
of persons as the ground of law. The universali-
ty of posited laws implies a more basic princip-
le:  if one proclaims that he or she has the au-
tonomy to be the source of laws, then he or she
must universalize this claim to include all mem-
bers of a political community – all are equal
Polit ikos sociologija Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2004/2, ISSN 1392-3358
14
sources of law. Without this procedure, one would
face a reverse contradiction: No one is the source
of laws, but I am the source of such laws.
Strictly speaking, politics has one major
task: an open domain in which every member of
the community participated in deciding public
questions.  Of course, such a position also im-
plies that all community members are equally
duty-bound to participate in all public affairs.
The term duty should not be read morally. The
concern is with an ethos, a way of being politi-
cal and of constantly keeping the public arena
open for public participation.  It is known that
the Athenians of ancient Greece regarded tho-
se who failed to participate it the public af-
fairs not as “nonpolitical” but as “incapable
of being.” Therein lies the goal of community
social research.  As we conceive it, communica-
tion politics is the keeping of the public arena
open for public participation and the right to
know.
The net result of the distinction between
the political and the social-private is the con-
ception that human autonomy requires politi-
cal community where the individual’s freedom
is guaranteed by a free establishment of laws
and a free acceptance of such laws.  Public and
free establishment of laws is, simultaneously,
an establishment of a political community as
its own purpose (i.e., the presence of the free-
dom of each individual to participate in the
establishment of laws and the maintenance of
the right of any individual to be an autono-
mous source of laws).
This framework allows the discussion of all
other purposes. One may establish other insti-
tutions, such as legislative, administrative, and
judicial, yet they too have the task of guarante-
eing that in the final analysis the autonomous
being remains the final arbiter or all public ru-
les. There is a hidden condition of this guaran-
tee:  In the public arena, all social and econo-
mic differences become disregarded and every-
one enters the public domain as an equal.
In a political community, a person acts from
respect for the law.  The composition of such a
respect means; first, that a person respects fre-
edom and is not subject to causes and impulses;
second, respect for law draws its nourishment
from requirement to maintain the autonomy of
everyone and thus to maintain the public are-
na.  In this arena, laws are not given as if they
were natural necessities, but depend on public
participation in their continuous preservation.
Third, their continuity means that freedom is
not merely one of  the social factors, but a con-
dition that is equally established and maintai-
ned actively. Fourth, the maintenance of poli-
tical freedom and the public sphere, requires
legitimate force capable of preserving the pub-
lic arena against private interests and individu-
als who reject the freely obtained laws.  Such
persons have rejected their own autonomy and
become subject to impulses and causes, to irra-
tional forces.  This should not be taken as if it
were a moral question; rather, it reveals the
ground of what is a political community and
the necessity of its preservation if the human is
to remain autonomous.
Rather, political community has its own et-
hos with respect to rights and duties in the public
domain.  The ethos requires a free, rational pub-
lic debate and agreement on laws, issuing from
mutually autonomous persons and their unders-
tanding of the necessity of maintaining the
rights of all. This ethos allows for tolerance and
the view that laws are not eternal. On public
agreement, they can be altered or rejected. Be-
cause the posited laws are practical, they must
meet the previously mentioned conditions of
pubic approval and universality.
Political Communication
In principle, the institution of representa-
tive government is not democratic unless cer-
tain conditions are met.  First, any person ap-
pointed by the public is bound legally to ac-
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complish what the public requests.  All other
activities claiming to be for the sake of the pub-
lic are illegal. This stems from the conception
that the sole source of legality is the public and
the decisions to which it binds its own members
and the public officials. The public official is
not to “lead” but to serve. Second, election is a
dialogical process.
Persons running for public office offer their
proposals on public questions; such proposals
become a covenant in case the official becomes
appointed. That is, because the public agreed
with the proposals and thus appointed a candi-
date to a public office, the public official is du-
ty-bound by that very covenant to carry out the
proposals. Any failure to do so is equivalent to
the breaking of a binding and communicated
agreement. Such officials must be dismissed from
the office immediately, and perhaps should be
prosecuted for criminal activities. Third, a can-
didate for office should not only offer his or
her proposals, but due to public discussions,
should modify his or her proposals based on pub-
lic input.
Ideological dogmas comprise one person’s
proposals, and should reflect possible modifi-
cations once they are exposed to public discus-
sion. In a political society, the duty of the can-
didate is not to expound on “future hope” and
‘grand visions,” or even “my dream of better
life,” but in the first instance to communicate
his or her public concerns and the concerns of
his or her constituency and to offer either prac-
tical or legal solutions to such concerns.  This
means that political communication, if it fol-
lows the structure of autonomous public and
its free domain, is responsible for the statements
made. Yet in this sense, private interests, moti-
vated by causes and irrational drives, hide, if
not abolish rational, logical and free discussion
of public issues.
Such a discussion need not be simplistic or
without controversies. Yet one principle is im-
portant: political communication consists of a
triadic structure. There is the subject matter of
concern that is addressed by a speaker and the
public or an opponent of the speaker. What is
to be avoided is the surface view, often para-
ded as “objective”: it is assumed that if two op-
posing opinions are presented, then the public
has an understanding of an “issue.” Yet a se-
rious dialogue requires a thorough exposition
of the subject matter of the arguments prior to
its obfuscation by the so-called “different view-
points.”
A simple exposition of viewpoints does not
constitute information; the subject mater of the
viewpoints is fundamental. In turn, the public
participation in the public arena requires that
it too should be cognizant of the subject matter
of discussion and not be a simple sum of yet
“other views” to be taken into account. Full ra-
tionality requires no less. It would be nonsensi-
cal to debate public policy on nuclear energy
without  first explaining what such energy is,
what it does, what are its effects, and how it
functions.  It would be argued persuasively that
the duty of the public, and above all a candida-
te for office who claims to possess an ability to
serve the public, not only is to be well-versed in
the subject matters that are of concern to the
public, but also to be able to present the sub-
ject matter to the public.
Journalism
Mass media, as transmitters of such know-
ledge, are among the most fundamental public
“institutions” of democracy.  Indeed, one could
plausibly contend that they are coextensive with
the continuous origination and maintenance of
the autonomous source of all laws and legiti-
mation.  The uniformed citizen is hardly in po-
sition to grasp public issues and to form a ratio-
nal judgment. Moreover, the very information
is a condition for public dialogue, debate, and
adjudication. Democracy, as an incessant self-
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maintenance, includes in its core the necessity
for open information, present and available to
everyone, not simply for the sake of extraneous
purposes, but for its own sake as part of the
ethos of democratic activity.
To speak in terms of the democratic prin-
ciples explicated so far, mass media and jour-
nalism are political communication to the ex-
tent that they are geared toward information
and thus the public.  In this sense, there is no
such thing as apolitical reporting.  This is to
say, in political society journalism is principally
political communication – prior to questions of
ideology or other agenda.
The public must be informed and the ethos
of journalism in democracy requires the repor-
ting of all such entrances in order to activate
the participation of the public in public issues.
Crucial to the concept of coextension between
democracy as its own purpose and journalistic
mass media is the principle that whenever jour-
nalists appeal to a right of free access to, and a
publication of information, they are in a pro-
cess of origination and maintenance of the au-
tonomous public domain  Such a demand is not
natural or social but political.
In democracy, political journalism is, abo-
ve all, duty bound to inform the public about
such obfuscating theatrics, and what ignoran-
ces, indecisions, equivocations, they are hiding.
In turn, journalistic political communication,
within the ethos of democracy, must articulate
and expose what is or is not relevant for the
public, what is private and particular, of no pub-
lic concern, and what is essential in the propo-
sals of current or prospective public figures.  If
such a public figure offers a technical solution
to some public concern, the task of journalistic
communication is not merely to repeat what
such a figure stated, but to raise questions whet-
her the statement is an accurate and adequate
comprehension of a given subject mater rele-
vant to public concerns.
How Can a Social Scientist
Promote Democratization?
In the communication literatures, dialogue
is typically concerned with the notion of spea-
king “with” rather than speaking “to” or “at”.
Presumable, speaking “with” signifies a concern
for the other, whether that other be an audien-
ce, a research respondent, or a conversational
partner. From the perspective of a social action
methodology, dialogue is expressive of the her-
meneutic principle of interpretive understan-
ding configure in the part-whole relationship,
and it additionally signifies a particular point
of view on the social.
In light of the hermeneutic principle, so-
cial science necessarily speaks from the pre-in-
terpreted, pre-reflective, pre-theoretical ground
of the life world. In other words, the taken-for-
granted fund of meaning that constitutes eve-
ryday social and cultural experience is the con-
dition for the possibility of theoretical know-
ledge about the experience. Social scientific
knowledge, then, is necessarily reflexive – it is
dependent on a pre-understanding or interpre-
tation as its condition of existence. This circums-
tance is not, however, the be-all and end-all of
debates regarding the relationship between so-
cial science and the social world.
The “speaking from” only reflects the foun-
dational experience that makes social science
possible. It does not reflect the founding acti-
vity by which social science creates a different
social world.  Intervention and transformation
are unavoidable components of research activi-
ties; thus it is critical that the interests of social
scientists be aligned with those of the commu-
nities of the researched.  In keeping with this
critical mandate, social action research acknow-
ledges the possibility that accountable enac-
tments of social scientific research can enable so-
cial action for positive change in and through the
political domain.
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Explicit in the conception of dialogue for-
malized in a community-based methodology is
the elaboration of social experience as a rela-
tionship between self, other, and world.  The dia-
logical character of interpretation is not simply
looking at an other, rather it is looking with an
other at some thing which the other seeks to com-
municate.  For the community-based researcher,
speaking to the social world is dependent on the
interobjectivity of the social relationship- self and
other oriented toward a thing held in common.
This is where the role of interpretive understan-
ding comes into play in community-based met-
hodology (Pilotta, Kreps 2001).
The notion of interpretive understanding
further points to the inanity of a “presupposi-
tionless” social science. Were it even possible
to purge oneself of one’s presuppositions, un-
derstanding could not be accomplished.  It is
only on the basis of one’s own suppositions
that the point of view of another person can
be understood.  In the research activity, the
point of critical self-reflection is to determine
which of one’s presuppositions are appropria-
te and which are inappropriate given a parti-
cular situation.  Understanding is understan-
ding something.
In this case, interpretive understanding is
the grasping of the way in which a community
defines its own (situated) interest. In social ac-
tion research, social issues become the common
object of orientation for researcher and resear-
ched, and it is in terms of the community’s de-
finition of those issues that the interest struc-
tures of social science and social action can be
aligned.  But in order for this to happen, rese-
archers must effectively gain community access.
The practice of social action research re-
quires that we develop general influence in the
community, and it demands that we create pub-
lic trust and public accountability.  In other
words, in critical social action research, the role
of the research-who-produces-research is repla-
ced by research activities that define the public
characteristics of the researchers.  In this, the
history of the research generates a motivatio-
nal basis, a public history establishing a place
for the researcher in the organization of the
social setting.  It is presupposed that it is not
the reality of a viewpoint that provides a wor-
king necessity, not that of an inaccessible vie-
wer. This premise operates to generalize the so-
cial code of authority beyond the private sphe-
re of researcher-dominated contingencies.
One must focus on the creation of public
spaces where the explicitness of the research ac-
tivity can become impressed on the researched.
It must be kept in mind that research activity is
thematically oriented on a problem of referen-
ce.  Hence, in effect, the explicitness of the re-
search activity diminishes the personal charac-
teristic of the researcher.  It is these personal,
privately established life-histories that form the
basis of the researcher’s anonymous authority,
namely, those things that cannot be “checked
out” by the researched, either because the rele-
vant information is unavailable or simply unin-
terpretable or meaningless to the research po-
pulation. A different style of authority must be
established for social action research to be ope-
rative, one that makes sense within the social
context.
This style of anonymization is one that ef-
faces locally irrelevant characteristics of the re-
searcher and at the same time permits, even re-
quires, the demonstration of the researcher’s
abilities.  The research thus becomes a “public”
or political person, with the relevant dimensions
of “public” being established within the rese-
arch setting. Nameless authorities, even and per-
haps most especially the authority of “science,”
do not in a social research setting give motiva-
tion for the researched population to answer
questions enabling it to be understood.
It is cliché to suggest that entrée is a conti-
nual process throughout the research that cons-
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tantly requires that attention of the researcher.
Yet, entrée is a continuous activity of building
reputational linkages for the purposes of estab-
lishing social validity and enticing relevant per-
sons to cooperate in the research process.  It is
a process of finding points of access through
which to bring in bear the general power of so-
cial scientific research in a form that is genera-
lizable both from the point of view of profes-
sional researchers and from that of the commu-
nity of subjects who provide the setting for the
research.
The social action researcher must build net-
works.  Without the networking of the com-
munity of the researched, it will not be possib-
le to establish the relevant parameters of the
community or to conduct the research in a fas-
hion that the community will perceive to be
valuable. In some cases, merely finding the com-
munity poses a problem, especially when we
keep in mind that this is not an exercise in de-
mography or geography, but rather in identi-
fying nodal points of interests and concerns. The
parameters of the community of concern of
course include community members, but they
can also include social service agencies, police
officers, public officials, and even local fun-
ding agencies.
“Truth” of the research is a function of the
viewpoints of the community of concern; if one
is not known and one’ credentials not establis-
hed to relevant persons, then the assumption is
that one has not done anything worthwhile, and
that is a good enough reason not to cooperate
with the researcher.  It is virtually impossible to
obtain adequate information as well as to work
with relevant individuals if one is perceived as a
stranger who has nothing to offer. The more
one’s name is heard, the more involved one is
viewed as being, and the more power is attribu-
ted to one in obtaining reliable information,
which is precisely what one needs in order to
get access to that information.
It is also imperative to establish contacts
within the community in order that different
community members will be able to check out
one’s credibility. One contact leads to the next,
and crossing networks enables the comparison
of perceptions about the researcher.  These net-
works are also valuable for the purpose of the
research being able to identify ways in which
information is being screened for her or his be-
nefit.  It is also important to learn about any
other research activity that may be going on or
that has recently been conducted in the com-
munity.  Past encounters with researchers may
have adverse consequences that must be atten-
ded to.  All of this involves a process of making
the rounds sufficiently in order that one’s na-
me, in terms of level and degree of involvement,
precedes one in the community.
Social reality is much too complex for rese-
arch to set abstract ethical maxims for decisions
in how to go about establishing trust.  Trust is
not a set of principles to which the research con-
forms or behavioral signposts for specific situa-
tions.  Rather, trust is acquired through sha-
ring various research practices and through for-
mulating the research in such a way that the
populace will be able to perceive in it the po-
tential for increasing their own individual or
community potential for action.
Trust is indispensable for getting beyond the
momentary interpersonal rituals.  Yet, for trust
to be built and sustained, there are required
auxiliary mechanisms of learning, symbolizing,
controlling, and even institutionalizing distrust.
Trust can be built and diffused if credible insti-
tutionalized supervisors are built into the rese-
arch process (e.g., community leaders). On the
other hand, where properly managed, trust can
actually be increased where distrust has been
institutionalized, particularly in minority com-
munities.  In such a situation, one needs to ap-
pear “different” by standards of some local co-
de, thereby employing a history as a means to
gaining a forum.
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2004/2, ISSN 1392-3358 Polit ikos sociologija
19
The reason for networking, trust building,
and allowing oneself to be evaluated by com-
munity members, generally of staking out the
research agenda within the community, as that
many communities are social-science-wise.  That
social research and social researchers in truth
are objects of distrust is a conviction in which
many community members sincerely trust.  At
this stage in the history of social science, many
communities view social science as either pro-
ducing social disenfranchisements or as being
simply irrelevant. Because of this broad tenden-
cy, one must be prepared at the very first en-
counter to answer thematic questions like “Who
is doing the research?”, “Who is this good
for?”, “Will it be of value to us?”, and “When
will we see results?” The researcher who has wor-
ked to develop a generalized influence in the
community will be able to respond effectively
to these concerns.
Social influence ultimately derives from suc-
cessful research involvement in the community.
“Success,” however, is not an end product; it is
more or less descriptive of the high points of
any specific project and can be anything from
creating a public uproar beneficial to the pro-
ject, to identifying and meaningfully addressing
community significances. In order to create con-
ditions for maximizing the possibility of attai-
ning such high points, products generated by
the research must receive endorsement from re-
levant, recognizable community leaders, and me-
dia resources must be utilized to make the pro-
ject and its objectives known.  Publicity, in its
most general sense, institutionalizes the public/
political character of the research. We will fo-
cus briefly on utilization of media resources.
Media coverage can be employed to open
up a project to the possibility of influencing
agencies and, indirectly, for drawing other public
institutions into the project at key points. In
addition, the community will begin to “see” it-
self and develop ways of placing the face and
the activity within the structure of overall com-
munity activity.
Media coverage is important for other rea-
sons. First, the community at large will be able
to monitor the project over time.  Second, it will
be viewed as pragmatically effective in a way that
is open for all to see for themselves.  Community
participants, especially leaders, will be less likely
to have to constantly justify the effectiveness of
the project. Because it tends to “enshrine” what
is significant, media coverage also helps to secu-
re cooperation and interest from public institu-
tions and their officials.  Eagerness to avoid pub-
lic embarrassment, or its possibility, is movie
enough for many public institutions.
Community newsletters, newspapers, and pub-
lic forums offer important channels for informing
the community, expanding its contacts, and for
providing a general thematic into which individu-
als can be attracted according to dimensions of
their personal interests. In addition, events beco-
me pragmatic accomplishments symbolizing the
project. Moreover, these events eventually beco-
me decontextualized points of reference whose
meaning is not time-bound but instead an endu-
ring “fact” or rationale for the project.
Project participation can be intensified by
involving community organizations at levels that
grant them access to institutional power, there-
by solidifying the roles of the organizations wit-
hin the community.  Every fact of a project ne-
eds to take on the character of publicness.  Such
facts are not only formation but also function
as reasons for the project. Whether in the form
of significant information or of activities, every
fact provides a justificatory structure for the pro-
ject and a way of creating its history.
All of these elements create a generalized
influence establishing a superstructure of pub-
lic meaning and involvement within which the
research activity can proceed. But at the rese-
arch level proper, the generalized condition is
that the research itself establish distinctive ex-
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pectations having a centered meaning-structu-
re that has reference to specific themes, con-
cerns, or purposes. At each point, the influen-
ce the researcher expects and assumes must be
connected with something that can be specified
in the social environment.
For influence to occur, the circumstances
must be linked up with local imperatives.  The
activity must be able to be located within the
social system. Clearly, social action research cre-
ates thematics, but these cannot provide a pri-
ori the full specification of the research process
to the community, the media, or the scientific
community. Rigid specification of the research
process will limit the flexibility- and so its po-
wer- to pursue variation of the thematic in res-
ponse to the contingencies of the environment.
Eventually, the selection and generaliza-
tion process come full circle; the research acti-
vity is justified not by interpersonal arrange-
ments about expectation, but on the basis of
community thematics.  These thematics in turn
are related to the influence of the research ac-
tivity on the thematics, which refer to the acti-
vities of the researcher in establishing thematic
orientations.  Thus, even research “authorities”
are tied into and must appeal to generalized
communication structures. (Luhmann 1982)
Epilogue
In general, the goal is to develop a set re-
gulative principles for the production of a de-
mocratic knowledge society, whereby we recog-
nize:
• the rational competence of individuals;
• that institutions are not an entirely dif-
ferent rational level from individuals;
• that scientific discourse and individual dis-
course need translation;
• the institutionalization of both discourse
are fundamental to the practice of de-
mocratic institution.
We recall Alfred Schütz as he saw each of
us as simultaneously (1) the man on the street,
(2) the expert, (3) the well-informed citizen
(Schütz 1964)  Thus, each of us possesses know-
ledge that is a collective legacy not particularly
the result of any inquiry of our own.  We owe
such knowledge to our family, school, communi-
ty, newspaper, radio, television, books, Internet,
as well as life conversations.  But if we are going
to maintain a well informed citizenry, we need
the mediating institution of public education,
honest journalism, and covenant democracy in a
joint effort to find a common civic good.
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